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OFFERS OF JUDGMENT AND RULE 68: A
RESPONSE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
LYNN SANDERS BRANHAM*

Chief Justice Warren Burger lamented the proliferation of lawsuits filed in state and federal courts during a speech recently delivered before members of the American Bar Association.' While
remonstrating that this inundation of cases imperils the judicial system, Justice Burger mentioned some steps which may ease the almost unmanageable burden on the courts.2 As an example of one
such step, the Chief Justice mentioned that Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure could be modified to further induce the
3
settlement of cases.
Chief Justice Burger's comments warrant the review of the
terms of Rule 68, 4 a rule too often neglected in law school civil procedure courses and overlooked by practitioners. This article highlights the pertinent provisions of Rule 68 and identifies the
problems posed by the rule as presently drafted. Then, proposed
* Assistant Professor, Thomas M. Cooley Law School; B.A., 1976, University of Illinois; J.D., 1980, University of Chicago Law School.

1. 70 A.B.A.J. 62 (1984).
2. Chief Justice Burger suggested improving trial court advocacy, increasing lawyer discipline programs, and curtailing discovery abuses as steps to ease

the burdens on the court system. Id. at 64-66.
3. Id. at 66.
4. Rule 68 states as follows:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect
specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the
service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is
accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter
judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence
thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the
offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the
liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which shall have the same
effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within a reasonable time
not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to determine
the amount or extent of liability.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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revisions designed to rectify the problems and enhance the utility of
Rule 68 as a settlement device are discussed.
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 68

Under Rule 68, a defending party, including a party defending
against a cross-claim or counterclaim, 5 may serve an offer of judgment upon the opposing party at any time more than ten days
before trial. An offer of judgment may also be used in cases where
the issue of liability has been resolved, but where the relief to be
awarded must still be determined. 6 In the offer of judgment, the
defending party agrees that a judgment may be rendered against
him according to the terms of his offer. The offer of judgment must
include the defendant's agreement to pay the plaintiff's costs which
have accrued at the time of the offer.
The plaintiff has ten days to accept the offer by written notice
served on the defendant. If accepted, either party may file the offer
and the notice of acceptance with the court. The clerk of the court
then enters judgment. If the plaintiff does not accept the offer
within ten days after service, it is deemed withdrawn. Evidence of
the offer is inadmissible except to decide what costs each party will
bear.

If the plaintiff does not accept the defendant's offer, the plaintiff assumes a risk. Under Rule 68, if the plaintiff prevails at trial
but recovers less than the relief afforded in the offer of judgment,
the plaintiff must pay the "costs incurred" after the offer was
made. 7 Requiring the prevailing plaintiff to pay costs is a departure
from Rule 54(d) where the prevailing party is usually awarded
8
costs.
The potential effect of a Rule 68 offer of judgment is demonstrated in the following example. Assume that the plaintiff is injured in a car accident involving another car driven by the
defendant. The plaintiff files suit alleging the defendant's negligence in a federal district court. 9 In the complaint, the plaintiff
seeks $100,000 in compensatory damages. A month later the de5. Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350 & n.5 (1981). Throughout
this article it is assumed that the defending party or offeror is the defendant
and the opposing party or offeree is the plaintiff.
6. In these cases the defending party must serve the offer of judgment
within ten days before the date of the hearing. FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
7. Id.

8. Rule 54(d) provides in part: "Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.

FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).

9. The federal district court has jurisdiction of the case because the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states.
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fendant tenders an offer of judgment to the plaintiff for $10,000
plus accrued costs. The plaintiff does not accept the offer, so discovery proceeds.
Several years later, the case comes to trial, and the jury returns
a verdict of $9,000 for the plaintiff. Normally, under Rule 54(d), the
victorious plaintiff can recover all of her costs from the defendant. 10
Under Rule 68, however, the plaintiff must bear all of her own costs
incurred since service of the offer of judgment because the amount
of money awarded her was less than the amount contained in the
offer of judgment. In addition to paying her own post-offer costs,
which may be several thousand dollars, the plaintiff must pay the
defendant for the costs he incurred since the time the offer of judgment was made. Thus, the plaintiff's ultimate recovery is substantially diminished through the operation of Rule 68.
The cost-shifting under Rule 68 places pressure on the plaintiff
to accept an offer of judgment and settle the case. Accepting the
offer assures the plaintiff some substantive relief. The plaintiff also
avoids the risk of paying the costs incurred by both parties after
service of the offer of judgment.
Besides inducing the plaintiff to settle, Rule 68 relieves the defendant of the burden of paying post-offer costs when he makes an
offer of judgment more favorable to the plaintiff than the judgment
ultimately entered. This latter purpose of Rule 68, however, is only
partially furthered under the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the rule in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August."
DELTA AIR LINES-RULE

68

AND THE PREVAILING DEFENDANT

In Delta Air Lines, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the following portion of Rule 68: "If the judgment finally
obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the
offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer."
The plaintiff had filed a Title VII suit against the defendant alleging that the defendant had discharged her because she was black. 12
The plaintiff sought reinstatement, approximately $20,000 in
backpay, attorney's fees, and costs. Several months after the institution of the lawsuit, the defendant served the plaintiff with an offer of judgment for $450, indicating in the offer that the sum of $450
included the plaintiff's attorney's fees. The plaintiff rejected the
13
offer and proceeded to trial where she lost.
10. For pertinent text of Rule 54(d), see supra note 8.
11. 450 U.S. 346 (1981).

12. Id. at 348.
13. Id. at 348-49.
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Although the district court entered judgment for the defendant, the court refused to require the plaintiff to pay the defendant's
costs incurred after the defendant served the offer of judgment on
the plaintiff. 14 The defendant contended that the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68 applied because the plaintiff had not recovered
more than $450 after trial. The court rejected that argument and
held that an offer of judgment must be at least "arguably reasonable" to trigger the operation of Rule 68.15 The defendant's offer, in
the court's opinion, did not meet this reasonableness requirement.
Hence, Rule 68 did not apply, and the court would not order the
16
plaintiff to pay any of the defendant's costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also
imported a reasonableness requirement into Rule 68, suggesting
that an offer of judgment should not be given effect unless it warrants the plaintiff's "serious consideration.' 1 7 The court of appeals
then affirmed the district court's order denying the defendant's motion for costs.' 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but in the majority
opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court skirted the central
question of whether a judge can disregard an offer of judgment
under Rule 68 because of purported unreasonableness. 19 Instead,
the Court held that Rule 68 is simply inapplicable when judgment
has been entered for the defendant. 20 In reaching the conclusion
that there is no mandatory cost-shifting under Rule 68 when the
defendant prevails, the Court relied on the language, purpose, and
2
history of the rule. '
In the majority's opinion, the less favorable "judgment finally
obtained by the offeree" referred to in the rule means a judgment
entered on the plaintiff's behalf. 22 Hence, the rule has no effect

when judgment has been entered for the defendant. 23 Justice
Rehnquist noted in his dissenting opinion, however, that the rule is
24
somewhat ambiguous and susceptible to a contrary interpretation.
Justice Rehnquist made the defensible argument that the plaintiff
14. Id. at 349.
15. Id. at 349 & n.3.
16. Id.
17. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 1979), affd,
450 U.S. 346 (1981).
18. Id. at 702.
19. Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
20. Id. at 352.
21. Id. at 350.
22. Id. at 351-52.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 366-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion.
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has obtained a judgment even when the defendant has prevailed. 2 5
Rule 54(a) defines a judgment as an order or decree from which an
appeal may be taken. Because the plaintiff may file an appeal once
judgment is entered for the defendant, the plaintiff has obtained a
judgment, albeit an unfavorable one, within the meaning of Rule
68.26

Justice Rehnquist's definition of when the plaintiff has obtained a judgment is buttressed by the examples of prototypical
judgments found in the Appendix of Forms accompanying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 7 These forms illustrate that when
the plaintiff prevails, the judgment may state that the plaintiff is to
recover a certain amount of money from the defendant. When the
plaintiff loses, the judgment may state that the plaintiff is to "take
nothing. '28 In either case, the plaintiff has obtained a judgment,
although in the latter situation, the judgment obtained is a "take
nothing" judgment.
The purpose of Rule 68 likewise refutes rather than substantiates the majority's interpretation of the rule. A central purpose of
Rule 68 is to promote the settlement of cases by increasing the risks
assumed by the plaintiff in pursuing a case through trial. 29 After an
offer of judgment has been served upon the plaintiff, the plaintiff
faces not only the usual risk of losing at trial, but also the prospect
of being forced to pay both the plaintiff's and defendant's post-offer
costs. The risk of paying these post-offer costs is diminished, however, under an interpretation of Rule 68 that proscribes mandatory
cost-shifting when the defendant prevails.
In the Court's view, the purpose of inducing settlements will
still be accomplished if Rule 68 is not applied when a defendant
prevails, because the losing plaintiff must still pay the defendant's
costs under Rule 54(d). 30 In other words, the Court believes that
because a losing plaintiff will have to bear the defendant's costs
under Rule 54(d) anyway, Rule 68 offers no additional incentive to
settle in cases where the defendant ultimately prevails. This conclusion, of course, overlooks the discretionary nature of Rule 54(d)
under which the trial court can relieve the losing party of the bur31
den of paying the costs incurred by the prevailing party.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 370-71.
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P., Forms 31 and 32, 28 U.S.C. app., at 530.
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee note, 102 F.R.D. 433 (1984); 7 J.

MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

68.02 (1979); 12 C. WRIGHT &

§ 3001 (1973).

30. Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 352.
31. For pertinent text of Rule 54(d), see supra note 8.
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There will be greater pressure placed on the plaintiff to settle a
case if an offer of judgment is deemed to shift costs when the defendant prevails. This is made apparent in the following example.
Assume that a nonindigent plaintiff is incarcerated in a state penitentiary. He files a suit for damages against the members of the
state's parole board alleging that he has been denied parole because
of his race. The facts corroborate the plaintiff's claim, but the defendants file a motion to dismiss, contending that they are absolutely immune from damages liability. At the same time, the
defendants serve the plaintiff with an offer of judgment for $2,500.
The district court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss, but recognizing that there is a substantial argument for deciding the immunity question the other way, permits the defendants to file an
interlocutory appeal with the court of appeals. The plaintiff, however, cannot wait until the court of appeals resolves the immunity
question to decide whether to accept the offer of judgment because
after ten days it will be deemed withdrawn.
In deciding whether to accept or reject the offer of judgment,
the plaintiff will know from Delta Air Lines that Rule 68 is inapplicable when the defendant prevails. Thus, if the court of appeals
holds that the defendants are immune from damages liability, the
case will be dismissed, and the plaintiff will not be required to pay
the defendants' post-offer costs. In this situation, the plaintiff may
be inclined to reject the offer of judgment. There is a chance the
plaintiff may still be required to pay the defendants' costs under
Rule 54(d). The court may exercise its discretion, however, and relieve the plaintiff of this burden because of the general importance
of suits filed to vindicate constitutional rights, the strength of the
plaintiff's claim of discrimination, and the tenuous nature of the
plaintiff's legal argument on the immunity question.
The plaintiff would more likely accept the offer of judgment if
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Rule 68 were adopted by the
Court.32 The plaintiff would know that if the defendants prevail on

appeal, then he would have to pay the defendants' costs incurred
after service of the offer of judgment, including the costs of appeal.
The risks assumed by the plaintiff in rejecting the offer of judgment
would be multiplied accordingly. Furthermore, the plaintiff would
be aware that even if the court of appeals affirms the denial of the
defendants' motion to dismiss, the parties would incur substantial
costs in preparing for trial. Protracted discovery disputes would
lead to mounting costs on both sides. Consequently, when served
with the offer of judgment, the plaintiff would realize the substantial financial risks entailed in pursuing the case to trial if Rule 68
requires post-offer costs to be shifted to the plaintiff when the de32. Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 366-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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fendant prevails. The prospect of mandatory shifting of thousands
of dollars of costs under Rule 68 might therefore lead to acceptance
of the offer of judgment. The same case might not be settled if the
plaintiff had substantial reason to believe that payment of the defendants' costs could be circumvented under Rule 54(d).
The Supreme Court has, however, concluded that Rule 68, as
presently drafted, is inapposite when a defendant prevails. Though
the language and purpose of the rule would have supported a contrary conclusion, 33 the Court's interpretation of the rule is a fait
accompli from which little backtracking can be anticipated.
Amendment of the rule to encompass cases where the defendant
prevails is nonetheless not precluded and is in fact advisable.
Amending the rule so that post-offer costs shift when a defendant,
who previously tendered an offer of judgment not accepted by the
plaintiff, prevails will prevent the anomalous results now possible
under the present interpretation of the rule. Presently, a defendant
who obtains a total victory is in a worse position in terms of paying
for costs than the defendant who obtains a partial victory. By
amending the rule, costs will shift not only when the plaintiff recovers some relief which is less than that specified in the offer of
judgment, but also when the plaintiff is awarded no relief at all.
ADVISABILITY OF ADDING A REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT TO
RULE 68
In considering possible amendments to Rule 68, the question
arises whether a provision should be added vesting a trial judge
with the discretion to disregard offers of judgment which the court
deems unreasonable. This reasonableness requirement was judicially imported into the rule by the district court in Delta Air
Lines.34 The district court in that case refused to order the plaintiff
to pay for the defendant's post-offer costs, stating that the $450 offer of judgment was not even "arguably reasonable" and hence not
33. The majority also based its conclusion on the purported history of Rule
68, noting that when Rule 68 was originally drafted, the state cases discussing
offers of judgment were almost uniformly cases in which the plaintiff had prevailed. Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 356-58 & nn.21-23. The "history" to which
the majority alluded, however, is by no means conclusive on the question of the
meaning of Rule 68, because under the general cost-shifting rules in the states
referred to, trial courts did not have the discretion which the federal district
courts have under Rule 54(d) to deny costs to a prevailing defendant. Id. at 373
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In those states, therefore, the offer of judgment
statutes were inapplicable when a defendant prevailed, because costs had to
shift anyway under the general cost-shifting rules. Id. at 373-74. For this reason, delving into the effect of offers of judgment was unnecessary when a defendant prevailed. Id.
34. August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699, 700 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979),
affd, 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
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a good-faith offer.35 The court observed that $450 would have been
a reasonable sum only if the plaintiff's claim was completely devoid
36
of merit or if other factors existed which favored the defendant.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the defendant's motion for costs. 37 Like

the district court, the Seventh Circuit found that Rule 68 contains
an implicit reasonableness requirement with which the defendant's
offer failed to comply. The Seventh Circuit determined that Rule
68 was inapplicable unless an offer of judgment warranted the
plaintiff's "serious consideration. "38
The Supreme Court did not resolve the question of whether
Rule 68 contains a reasonableness requirement and held that the
39
rule is simply inapplicable in cases where the defendant prevails.
The Court did, however, express some consternation at the thought
that, absent some limitation on the express words of Rule 68, a palpably frivolous offer of judgment could trigger the provisions of the
rule.40 If the rule were then interpreted or amended to apply in
cases in which the defendant prevails, defense counsel would, as a
matter of course in every case, tender offers of judgment for a dollar or even a penny. 41 If the defendant subsequently prevailed, the
court would be divested of its discretion under Rule 54(d) to deny
4 2
post-offer costs to the prevailing defendant.
The Supreme Court was obviously bothered by an interpretation of Rule 68 that would render meaningless the provision of Rule
54(d) granting trial courts the discretionary authority to deny costs
to the prevailing party. But equally bothersome is the lower courts'
interpretation of Rule 68 in Delta Air Lines under which the literal
terms of the rule were rendered meaningless through judicial importation of a reasonableness requirement. 43 The rule itself should
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 702.
38. Id. at 701.
39. Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 352.
40. Id. at 353.
41. Id. at 353 n.11.
42. Id. at 353.
43. The lower courts' interpretation is troubling because the terms of Rule
68 regarding the shifting of costs are mandatory: "If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay
the costs incurred after the making of the offer." FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (emphasis
added). This mandatory language can be contrasted with the language in other
rules, such as Rule 30(g)(1), where the shifting of costs is discretionary: "If the
party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition fails to attend and proceed
therewith and another party attends in person or by attorney pursuant to the
notice, the court may order the party giving the notice to pay to such other
party the reasonable expenses incurred by him and his attorney in attending,
including reasonable attorney's fees." FED. R. Civ. P. 30(g)(1) (emphasis
added).
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expressly delimit the circumstances when an offer of judgment will
not be given effect. 4 Accordingly, unless the rule on its face confines its application to "arguably reasonable" offers, or offers warranting the plaintiff's "serious consideration," an offer of judgment
should not be sua sponte nullified by a court because the offer fails
to meet the judge's expectations of reasonableness.
The question remains whether the rule should be amended to
exclude unreasonable offers of judgment. One obvious disadvantage of such an amendment is that, by making the cost-shifting
under the rule discretionary rather than mandatory, the inducement to settle a case resulting from an offer of judgment will be
weakened, perhaps substantially. As long as the plaintiff is afforded a means of escaping the effect of an offer of judgment, the
plaintiff will be more inclined to disregard it.
Another related drawback of amending Rule 68 to include
some sort of reasonableness limitation is the uncertainty that will
replace the presently straightforward analysis under the rule. At
present, a court simply compares the relief proffered in the offer of
judgment with the relief finally awarded the plaintiff. The court
orders the plaintiff to pay post-offer costs if the plaintiff obtains a
less favorable recovery than that contained in the offer of
judgment.
If a reasonableness requirement is added to the rule, a court
will have to engage in a complicated post hoc review of the merits of
the plaintiff's case to assess whether an offer of judgment tendered
to the plaintiff, perhaps years earlier, was reasonable. In making
this assessment, the court will presumably examine such factors as
the likelihood that the plaintiff could have recovered more than the
amount contained in the offer of judgment, the difference between
the amount offered and the amount of the potential recovery, the
plaintiff's actual recovery, the costs and fees incurred by both the
plaintiff and the defendant in pursuing the litigation through trial,
and the burdens placed on the judicial system in adjudicating the
parties' dispute. The perplexity of this inquiry will invite disputes
regarding the reasonableness of offers of judgment. 45 Rather than
serving as a simple device to terminate controversy and promote
44. Other federal rules identify the circumstances in which the rules will
not be given effect. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 37(a)(4). Rule 37(a)(4) provides
that when a motion to compel discovery is granted, the party whose conduct
necessitated the filing of the motion shall pay the reasonable expenses incurred
in obtaining the order compelling discovery "unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust." Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(E),
37(d), & 45(f).
45. See, e.g., Chesny v. Marek, 547 F. Supp. 542, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted,104 S. Ct. 2149
(1984). The plaintiff in Chesny attempted to avoid the cost-shifting effect of an
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the settlement of cases, an offer of judgment will itself become a
major source of controversy in a case.
In addition, an element of unfairness might be injected into a
case when the plaintiff is faced with an offer of judgment whose
effect is uncertain. The plaintiff might, for example, decide not to
accept an offer of judgment, contemplating that a court will hold
that the offer was unreasonable. The court's subsequent assessment of the offer of judgment might very well differ from the plaintiff's, however, because the assessments of the offer are made at
different times. Thus, an offer of judgment that might appear unreasonable before discovery has commenced, might appear quite
reasonable after discovery and a trial have revealed the strength of
the defendant's position.46 A plaintiff would then presumably have
to pay for the parties' post-offer costs even though the plaintiff did
not accept the offer because he assumed, in good faith, that the offer was unreasonable.
Adding an express reasonableness requirement to Rule 68
might therefore undermine and unduly complicate the rule's operation. At the same time, such an added requirement might be spurious and unnecessary because an offer of judgment which offered
more relief to the plaintiff than the relief ultimately recovered is
"arguably reasonable" on its face, at least when viewed in retrospect. From this perspective, even an offer of judgment for a dollar
could be reasonable if the defendant ultimately prevails. If the defendant, on the other hand, does not prevail, and the plaintiff recovers more than the nominal amount proffered in the offer of
judgment, the court could consider the defendant's half-hearted attempt to settle the case when exercising its discretion to allocate
costs under Rule 54(d).
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OFFERS OF JUDGMENT

Under some circumstances, however, an offer of judgment may
be unreasonable even when the defendant prevails. For example,
an offer of judgment for a nominal amount might be unreasonable
when tendered to a plaintiff in a civil rights action in which the
prevailing plaintiff is statutorily entitled to attorney's fees as part of
offer of judgment by arguing that the $100,000 offer was not "reasonable." Id. at
545.
46. The unfairness resulting from a retrospective determination of the reasonableness of an offer of judgment can be diminished if the court assesses the
reasonableness of the offer of judgment from the plaintiff's viewpoint at the
time the offer was made. Rule 68 would then be substantially weakened, however, as plaintiffs point to facts not known at the time the offer of judgment was
made to support their contentions that the offer appeared unreasonable and
hence should be given no effect.
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his or her costs. 47 The attorney's fees provisions of these civil rights
statutes are designed to induce attorneys to file suits on behalf of
individuals whose civil rights have been violated but who cannot
afford to pay the attorney's fees to vindicate their rights.
If a defendant's offer of judgment does not include attorney's
fees in these civil rights cases, Rule 68 will discourage the filing of
civil rights suits. When, for example, a defendant serves an offer of
judgment on a plaintiff who has filed a civil rights claim, the plaintiff may want to accept the offer to avoid the risk of paying both
parties' post-offer costs. If the plaintiff accepts the offer, the plaintiff's attorney will in most cases be left unrecompensed for the time
already spent litigating the case. This lack of return for the time
invested in the case, due to the client's acceptance of an offer of
judgment, will strongly discourage attorneys from handling civil
rights suits. The fact that acceptance of the offer of judgment will
leave the attorney empty-handed may also lead to a conflict of interest in which the attorney's interests are furthered by pursuing
the litigation while the client's interests are best served by accepting the offer of judgment.
Attorney's Fees as Part of the Offer

To avert these problems, several courts have interpreted Rule
68 to encompass the plaintiff's attorney's fees when an offer of judgment is tendered in a civil rights action. 48 An offer to pay "costs
incurred" includes an offer to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees that
have accrued at the time the offer of judgment is made. 49 This interpretation, however, has spawned other problems.
First, if the attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting a civil rights
claim are encompassed by Rule 68, it is unclear whether the offer of
judgment must specifically state that the offer includes the plaintiff's accrued attorney's fees. Under one possible approach, the attorney's fees must be specifically offered or the offer of judgment is
invalid. Under another approach, specification is unnecessary because payment of the fees is an implicit term of an offer in a case
where the prevailing plaintiff is statutorily entitled to attorney's
47. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 (1982). This statute includes an award of attorney's fees as part of the
prevailing plaintiff's costs. See also Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1975) (lists twenty-nine of the federal statutes providing for an award of attorney's fees).
48. See, e.g., Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1983);
Chesny v. Marek, 547 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2149 (1984); Waters v.
Heublein Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
49. Fulps, 715 F.2d at 1095; Waters, 485 F. Supp. at 114; see also Scheriff v.
Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (D. Colo. 1978) (offer in civil rights action was
defective since it excluded attorney's fees).
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50
fees as part of his costs.

Under a third approach, the onus of identifying the plaintiff's

51
attorney's fees as part of the recovery is placed on the plaintiff.

The plaintiff must state in the written acceptance that the defendant will pay the plaintiff's accrued attorney's fees. If the plaintiff
fails to claim attorney's fees, and the offer of judgment is silent on
the matter, the plaintiff cannot recover any fees from the defendant
although the case will otherwise be settled in accordance with the
terms of the offer. 52 Alternatively, if the offer does not specify fees
as part of the plaintiff's recovery but the acceptance does, the offer
will be void because there was not a "meeting of the minds" on the
terms of the offer. 53 This will occur even if the plaintiff expected
that the fees would be paid because the case was filed under a substantive statute which provided for attorney's fees. The litigation
54
will then proceed.
The uncertainty regarding the circumstances in which a plaintiff will recover attorney's fees after accepting an offer of judgment
is not conducive to the settlement of cases, a primary objective of
Rule 68. At present, a civil rights plaintiff, confronted with an offer
of judgment that does not mention the plaintiff's attorney's fees,
does not know if the offer is void on its face or valid. The dubious
validity of the offer consequently diminishes the pressure exerted
on the plaintiff to settle. The plaintiff, confronted with an offer of
judgment whose legal effect is unknown, may prefer to reject the
offer, pursue a greater recovery at trial, and if unsuccessful, contest
the validity of the offer.
50. See Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088, 1095 (6th Cir. 1983).
51. Gamlen Chem. Co. v. Dacar Chem. Prod. Co., 5 F.R.D. 215, 216 (W.D.
Pa. 1946). The defendants in that case were charged with copyright infringement and unfair competition. Id. at 215. The defendants tendered an offer of
judgment under Rule 68 for $500, plus costs to date. Id. The plaintiffs accepted
this offer, but later requested the court to award reasonable attorney's fees as
part of the costs. Id. The court found that the defendants did not intend to
include attorney's fees in their offer, even though plaintiffs are typically
awarded attorney's fees in copyright actions. Id. at 216. The court then held
that the acceptance of an offer under Rule 68 must specifically set forth the
claim for attorney's fees if attorney's fees were not included as part of the offer.
Id. Cf. Cruz v. Pacific Am. Ins. Corp., 337 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1964). The court in
Cruz observed that it was unclear whether the offer of judgment was tendered
pursuant to Rule 68 or pursuant to a Guam procedural statute. Id. at 748. The
Guam statute was similar to Rule 68, but under the statute, accrued costs were
not expressly required to be in the offer. Id. at 748 n.1. In any event, the plaintiffs in Cruz were not awarded attorney's fees because they failed to specifically
claim them in their acceptance of the offer of judgment. Id. at 750.
52. Gamlen Chem. Co., 5 F.R.D. at 216.
53. Greenwood v. Stevenson, 88 F.R.D. 225, 232 (R.I. 1980).
54. Id.
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Specification of Attorney's Fees as Part of the Offer
Rule 68 should be clarified so that when a plaintiff has filed a
claim under which the prevailing plaintiff is statutorily entitled to
attorney's fees, the defendant must state in the offer of judgment
that the offer includes these fees. Failure to specifically include attorney's fees within the offer to settle such a claim would then invalidate the offer of judgment.
Requiring the defendant in these cases to separately specify attorney's fees as part of the relief proffered in the offer of judgment
will also obviate another problem. At present, some defendants
make offers for a specified sum of money, stating that the plaintiff's
attorney's fees are to be paid out of that designated sum. 55 These

offers in which attorney's fees are merged with the other substantive relief offered the plaintiff can lead to innumerable problems
when the offer has been rejected and the court must calculate
whether the plaintiff's ultimate recovery has exceeded the defendant's offer of judgment.
Assume, for example, that the defendant in a section 1983 civil
rights suit tenders to the plaintiff an offer of judgment for $10,000.
The offer states that the amount includes both the plaintiff's attorney's fees and the plaintiff's substantive recovery. The plaintiff rejects the offer and proceeds to trial where the jury returns a verdict
for $5,000. Calculating whether the $10,000 offer of judgment was
more favorable to the plaintiff than the $5,000 verdict will depend
on whether the judge awards the plaintiff attorney's fees which
equal or exceed $5,000. What Rule 68 envisions as a simple costshifting procedure that can be handled by the clerk of the court will
become a complicated process in which the shifting of costs will depend on the results of the judge's multifaceted inquiry into the
56
amount of attorney's fees the plaintiff incurred.
Permitting the defendant to subsume attorney's fees within a
general amount of money offered the plaintiff may have even more
egregious consequences if the offer is accepted. If the offer of judgment fails to distinguish the amount of money to be paid the plaintiff from the fees to be paid plaintiff's counsel, the plaintiff and the
plaintiff's counsel will have to divide the sum when the offer is accepted. The plaintiff may be left with no recovery, or even a negative recovery, after paying attorney's fees. The plaintiff's recovery
will be paltry even though it is apparent, under the realistic assess55. See, for example, the offer of judgment at issue in Delta Air Lines v.
August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
56. That inquiry might in turn be affected and distorted by the court's
awareness that its decision regarding the fee award might trigger the operation
of Rule 68.
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ment of the strength of the plaintiff's claim that the offer of judgment was designed to induce, that a larger recovery is warranted.
The plaintiff's attorney, on the other hand, may be left with a
sum which is not satisfactory compensation for the time expended
on the case. 57 As a consequence of this minimal compensation, attorneys will be dissuaded from filing such lawsuits. At the same
time, those attorneys who continue to handle such cases may be
faced with conflicts of interest when their clients are served with
offers of judgment. The attorney's interests, unlike the client's,
may be best served by rejecting the offer of judgment.
Determinationof Fee Award by the Court
Such conflicts of interest will also arise if the decision regarding the amount of attorney's fees to be paid plaintiff's counsel is
vested in the defendant. If the amount of fees specified by the defendant will not adequately compensate the plaintiff's attorney for
the time devoted to the case, the plaintiff's attorney might be faced
with a dilemma. The attorney's own interests, which favor rejection of the offer of judgment, may be at odds with the interests of
the client, which favor acceptance.
At other times, the interests of the plaintiff's attorney might
propel acceptance of an offer of judgment which would not be accepted if the attorney's self-interest did not skew his judgment and
advice regarding the advisability of accepting the offer. Such a conflict will normally ensue when the Rule 68 offer contains a generous amount of attorney's fees. In such a situation, the economic
pressure placed on the plaintiff's attorney, who has most likely
agreed to handle the case without any assurance of compensation in
the first place, is greatly exacerbated by the prospect of being
barred from recovering any post-offer fees if the plaintiff prevails
but recovers less than the amount specified in the offer of judgment. 58 An offer of attorney's fees in the offer of judgment will
constitute a powerful inducement for plaintiff's counsel to settle.
57. The consequences of such minimal compensation would be much like
the consequences which would follow if the defendants were not required to
include attorney's fees as part of the relief proffered in offers of judgment
served in actions in which there are statutory fee awards. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
58. This economic pressure would be diminished, of course, if an offer of
judgment had no effect on the recovery of the plaintiff's post-offer attorney's
fees even though the defendant was required to offer attorney's fees as part of
the offer of judgment. Excluding the plaintiff's post-offer attorney's fees from
the scope of Rule 68 while requiring the defendant to include such fees in the
offer would, however, eliminate a strong incentive for the settlement of cases
involving statutory fees awards. Since this incentive can be preserved while
settlements are reached which are compatable with the purposes of the statutes, see infra note 76 and accompanying text, the plaintiff's attorney's fees
should not only be included in the relief tendered in an offer of judgment but
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Vesting the trial court with the duty to determine the amount
of plaintiff's attorney's fees after an offer of judgment is accepted
will not eliminate the conflicts of interest which arise when the parties set the fees. If the offer of judgment contains an offer of attorney's fees, with the amount to be determined by the trial court, the
plaintiff's attorney will still be assured reasonable compensation if
the client accepts the offer. If the client rejects the offer, the attorney may still be barred from recovering any fees for the time expended on the case after service of the offer of judgment. The
attorney's interest in accepting or rejecting the offer of judgment
may therefore still not correspond with the client's.
The conflicts of interest will be diminished, however, if the
trial judge determines the fee award rather than the defendant.
The defendant will not be able to place additional pressure on plaintiff's counsel to settle by offering excessive compensation for the
time expended on the case. The defendant will also be unable to
offer an inadequate amount of attorney's fees in an offer of judgment. This would be desirable because giving a defendant the authority to unilaterally decide the amount of compensation to be
paid opposing counsel will obviously deter attorneys from representing plaintiffs in civil rights actions and other lawsuits in which
there is a statutory fee award.
Allocating to the judge, rather than to the defendant, the authority to decide the amount of attorney's fees to be paid to the
plaintiff if an offer of judgment is accepted does have a disadvantage. The defendant may be able to calculate fairly accurately the
costs incurred by the plaintiff before an offer of judgment is served.
The amount of the plaintiff's attorney's fees, however, will be much
more difficult to ascertain, especially if plaintiff's counsel has expended a lot of time in factual investigation, legal research, and
other behind-the-scene matters. In making the offer of judgment
then, the defendant will be exposing himself to an uncertain
amount of liability. This indefiniteness might discourage defendants from making offers of judgment in cases in which defendants
must include attorney's fees as part of the offer.
The uncertainty regarding the consequences of making such an
offer of judgment appears almost infinitesimal, however, when
compared to the uncertainty regarding the final outcome of the case
if litigated through trial. If the case is tried, the defendant will not
only not know the amount of attorney's fees which will be awarded
the prevailing plaintiff, but the plaintiff's substantive relief will also
be in doubt. Because of this compounded uncertainty, a defendant
may still opt for the lesser uncertainty attending the making of an
also in the post-offer expenses barred through operation of an offer of
judgment.
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offer of judgment. In making such an offer, the defendant can still
in a sense "control" the amount of fees paid to plaintiff's counsel by
making the offer relatively early after the onset of the litigation.
In any event, the advantages of having the judge decide the
amount of attorney's fees to be paid to the plaintiff pursuant to an
offer of judgment outweigh the disadvantages. As discussed earlier,
placing the decision in the hands of the judge reduces the conflicts
of interest confronting a plaintiff's attorney whose client has been
served with an offer of judgment.
THE MEANING OF "COSTS" UNDER RULE 68

Maintaining the TraditionalMeaning of the Term "Costs"
Rule 68 should be amended so that attorney's fees are differentiated from costs and so that the authority to determine the amount
of the plaintiff's fees is vested in the court. These changes will lend
consistency to the federal rules. At present, some courts have held
that the term "costs" has one meaning in Rule 54 and another
meaning in Rule 68. These courts have held that the term "costs"
in Rule 68 encompasses attorney's fees when there is an applicable
statutory fee provision.59 Distinguishing attorney's fees from costs
in Rule 68 will reconcile the two rules so that in both, the term
"costs" will retain its traditional meaning. Separating attorney's
fees from costs in Rule 68 will also make the rule compatible with
other federal rules in which, if an award of attorney's fees is con60
templated, attorney's fees are specifically mentioned.
Inclusion of Defendant's Costs
Amending Rule 68 so that the costs which the defendant offers
to pay are separate from the plaintiff's attorney's fees will also
make the rule itself consistent. Rule 68 refers to costs in two different places: first, in the requirement that an offer of judgment include an offer to pay "costs then accrued," and second, in the
provision that the offeree pay "the costs incurred" after the offer is
made if the offeree's recovery is less favorable than the offer of
judgment. At least one court has interpreted Rule 68 so that a
59. Chesny v. Marek, 547 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (under Rule 68 plaintiff could not recover post-offer costs, including attorney's fees in a civil rights
action, because the jury award to plaintiff was less than defendant's offer of
judgment), affd in part and rev'd in part, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 2149 (1984); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 110 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (plaintiff, in a Title VII suit, could not recover attorney's fees incurred after defendant's offer of judgment because the offer exceeded plaintiff's
final award).
60. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Under Rule 3 7 (a)(4), a court may
award "reasonable expenses ... including attorney's fees" to a party who wins
a discovery dispute. Id.
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plaintiff is only required to pay his own post-offer costs and not the
defendant's. 61 This interpretation, however, is not supported by the
language of the rule which states that the offeree must pay "the
costs incurred" after the offer is made and not that the offeree must
pay "the offeree's costs incurred.162 The interpretation is also at
odds with the purpose of Rule 68 to induce settlements, because the
incentive to settle will of course be stronger if, in rejecting an offer
of judgment, a plaintiff risks paying not only the plaintiff's but also
the defendant's costs incurred after the making of the offer of judgment. Including the defendant's post-offer costs within the potential financial burden assumed by a plaintiff who rejects an offer of
judgment will also be consonant with the rule's objective to relieve
a defendant of the burden of paying for expenses that could have
63
been avoided had the plaintiff accepted the offer of judgment.
The Defendant's Attorney's Fees
If the term "costs" referred to in the first part of Rule 68 is
interpreted to include attorney's fees, then it would seem logical
that attorney's fees are also included when the same word is used
subsequently in the rule. Such an interpretation, however, could
mean that a civil rights plaintiff who rejected an offer of judgment
and then obtained a less favorable recovery at trial will be forced to
pay, not only the plaintiff's and defendant's post-offer costs, but also
the plaintiff's and defendant's attorney's fees incurred after the offer was made.
The courts have balked at placing such an onerous financial
burden on plaintiffs and have held that Rule 68 generally does not
shift the burden of paying the defendant's attorney's fees to the
plaintiff.6 4 The result, although perhaps understandable on policy
grounds, is a disconcerting example of judicial improvisation. The
term "costs" in one part of the rule is given a meaning which departs from its traditional interpretation because of the concern that
excluding fees from the relief proffered a civil rights plaintiff in an
offer of judgment will discourage civil rights litigation. The meaning of the term "costs" is further contorted in a subsequent part of
61. Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 359 n.24. See also Chesny, 547 F. Supp. at
547.
62. For text of Rule 68, see supra note 4.
63. Staffend v. Lake Central Airlines, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 218, 219 (N.D. Ohio
1969).
64. See Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 366 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring) (dicta
stating that an offer of judgment will not normally shift the defendant's postoffer attorney's fees because while attorney's fees are usually awarded to a prevailing plaintiff, a prevailing defendant is only awarded fees when the suit was
frivolous); Chesny, 547 F. Supp. at 547 (defendants are not prevailing parties
under statute because they have lost the case so their costs do not include attorney's fees); Waters, 485 F. Supp. at 117.
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the rule with courts announcing that, although the word encompasses attorney's fees, only the plaintiff's attorney's fees and not the
defendant's fees fall within the rubric of the rule.65 This interpretation of the rule is again grounded not on its words but on a solicitous concern for plaintiffs, especially plaintiffs who have filed civil
66
rights actions.
These concerns should be addressed through amendment of
Rule 68 rather than through a disingenuous twisting of the literal
meaning of the words in the rule. Rule 68 should be amended so
that an offer of judgment is required to contain, not only an offer to
pay costs then accrued, but also an offer to pay the plaintiff's reasonably accrued attorney's fees when the plaintiff's claim includes
statutory entitlement to attorney's fees. The rule should further
specify that the amount of the fees will be determined by the court
following acceptance of the offer of judgment.
Rule 68 should also be clarified to state that, if the judgment
finally obtained by the offeree is less favorable than the offer of
judgment, the offeree must pay the plaintiff's and defendant's costs
incurred after the making of the offer as well as the plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred after the offer. The defendant's attorney's
fees would then clearly not fall within the financial risks assumed
by a plaintiff who rejects an offer of judgment.
Adding the defendant's attorney's fees to the risks taken in rejecting an offer of judgment would admittedly accentuate the pressure on the plaintiff not to proceed further with the litigation.
Because Rule 68, as envisioned, will give effect to even nominal of65. See supra note 64.
66. When applying Rule 68, the courts rationalize the differential treatment
of plaintiffs' and defendants' attorney's fees by pointing to the differential treatment of these fees under the substantive civil rights statutes. For example,
while the prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII suit is ordinarily entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982), a prevailing defendant is entitled
to attorney's fees only if the plaintiff's suit was frivolous or without foundation.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
There is, however, no indication in the language or history of Rule 68 that
its procedural effect is dependent on the substantive statute under which the
plaintiff brought a claim. Cf. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752
(1980). In Roadway Express, the Supreme Court construed the meaning of the
word "costs" in 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides for an assessment of costs
against an attorney who "unreasonably and vexatiously ... multiples" the proceedings in a lawsuit. The Court observed that it would resort to the understanding of the meaning of the term "costs" at the time § 1927 was enacted, and
that the meaning of the word in § 1927 should not be changed by an expanded
definition under each separate substantive statute upon which a lawsuit may be
based. Id. at 759, 761. Consequently, the Court held that the word "costs" in
§ 1927 does not include attorney's fees, even in a lawsuit brought under Title
VII in which attorney's fees may often be recovered as part of the costs. The
Court also noted that it would be improper judicial legislation to incorporate
into § 1927 Title VII's differential treatment of a prevailing plaintiff's and defendant's right to recover attorney's fees. Id. at 762.
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fers of judgment, including the defendant's attorney's fees within
the scope of the rule would effectuate a substantial overhaul of the
American system of fee allocation under which each party generally bears his or her own attorney's fees. 67 The threat of being required to pay the potentially enormous attorney's fees of one's
opponent would create a tremendous disincentive to the pursuit of
litigation, not only of civil rights suits but of other lawsuits as
well.

68

Poor and middle class plaintiffs would be particularly disadvantaged by a rule change which makes it possible to place the burden
of the defendant's post-offer attorney's fees on the plaintiff. The
greatly enhanced risks of rejecting an offer of judgment might lead
an individual who is poor or of moderate means to accept an offer of
judgment even though the offer is pathetically low when compared
to the merits of the case.
To prevent offers of judgment from giving such a comparative
advantage to those of greater means against those of lesser means,
the question of whether the defendant's post-offer attorney's fees
should shift could fall within the discretion of the trial court. Adding such a discretionary component to Rule 68, however, would
create the same problems of uncertainty and unfairness which
would occur, as discussed above, if judges had the discretion to disregard unreasonable offers of judgment. Uncertainty as to how the
67. If abandonment of the "American Rule" of fees allocation is warranted,
there will still remain the question of who should instigate the change, the
Supreme Court under its rulemaking authority, or Congress by statute. In the
past, the Supreme Court has resisted appeals to create exceptions to the "American Rule," noting that the longstanding practice of requiring each party to bear
its own costs should be respected by the Court unless modified by statute. See
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247-50 (1975).
See also Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
2149 (1984). In Chesny, the court observed that courts have no power under
Rule 68 to change the allocation of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The
court cited the Rules Enacting Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." For a discussion of pending statutory reform of attorney's fees, see
Rader, The Fee Awards Act of 1976: Examining the Foundationfor Legislative
Reform of Attorney's Fees Shifting, 18 J. MAR. L. REv. 77 (1984).
68. See Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 2149 (1984). In Chesny, the court addressed the question of whether a plaintiff in a civil rights suit, whose recovery after trial was less than the amount
proffered in an offer of judgment, was precluded from recovering post-offer attorney's fees. If an offer of judgment had not been tendered to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff would have been entitled to these fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section
1988 authorizes reimbursement to the prevailing party in a civil rights suit of a
"reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
The court observed that interpreting Rule 68 to bar recovery of post-offer
attorney's fees would conflict with the policy of § 1988 by discouraging attorneys from bringing civil rights suits. Id. at 478. The court accordingly held that
the word "costs" in Rule 68 should not be interpreted to include attorney's fees
incurred after service of the offer of judgment.
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court will view the defendant's entitlement to attorney's fees might
cause one plaintiff to accept an offer of judgment which would
otherwise be rejected. On the other hand, another plaintiff might
reject an offer of judgment because of a good-faith belief that the
equities weighed against an award of post-offer fees to the defendant. A good-faith and reasonable but inaccurate prediction could
then lead to the incursion of a crushing financial burden on an impecunious plaintiff.
Amending Rule 68 to encompass cases in which the defendant
prevails, expanding the rule as discussed below so that plaintiffs can
make offers of judgment, eliminating ambiguities in the rule which
impair its effectiveness, and terminating the importation of a reasonableness limitation into the rule should strengthen Rule 68,
making it an effective settlement device. Only if these measures
69
prove inadequate to the task should more drastic steps be adopted.
CLASS ACTION SUITS

When a plaintiff files a class action suit, the relief specified in
an offer of judgment may be considered unreasonable even though
the relief ultimately procured by the plaintiff class is less favorable
than that afforded by the offer of judgment. This unreasonableness
is due to the peculiar fact that a class action suit is brought by a
class representative and not by every individual member of the
class who will gain from a favorable judgment for the plaintiff. The
class representative files the lawsuit and bears the financial cost of
the lawsuit as it is being litigated. The benefits of this suit will be
spread throughout the class if the plaintiff prevails. If the defend69. In 1983, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure suggested the taking of such drastic steps to enhance
the efficacy of Rule 68. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 361-63 (1983). Under the 1983 proposals
to amend Rule 68, the offeree would have to pay the offeror's post-offer attorney's fees if the judgment ultimately obtained was not more favorable than the
rejected offer. The proposals, which were heavily criticized, have since been
withdrawn.
In July of 1984, the Advisory Committee submitted a new proposal to the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. For the full text of the proposal, see Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102
F.R.D. 432-33 (1984). Under the 1984 proposal, an offer of judgment may still
lead to the shifting of post-offer attorney's fees, but the shifting of fees is permitted, rather than mandated, by the proposed rule. In determining the sanction to be imposed on an offeree who unreasonably rejected an offer of
judgment, the court is to consider all of the circumstances existing at the time
of rejection.
The proposal is presently being circulated for public comment scheduled to
end on April 1, 1985. Letter of Submission to the Bench and Bar, Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 102 F.R.D. 410 (1984).
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ant prevails, however, the class representative will generally remain uncompensated for the costs incurred in litigating the
lawsuit. 70 The class representative may not only be left paying for
the plaintiff's costs and attorney's fees, but may also be required to
pay the defendant's post-offer costs if Rule 68 encompasses class action suits. Consequently, when served with an offer of judgment,
the risk confronting a class representative of paying a disproportionate share of the costs is accentuated and multiplied.
It is true that a class representative already faces the risk of
paying a disproportionate share of the defendant's costs if the defendant prevails, because costs, both pre-offer and post-offer, are
normally awarded to the prevailing party under Rule 54(d). If the
defendant prevails, the class representative will pay these costs and
generally have no right to reimbursement from other class members. As noted earlier, however, the award of costs under Rule
54(d) is discretionary with the court. In exercising its discretion,
the court may consider the fact that an award of costs will be unduly burdensome to the unsuccessful party. 71 When awarding costs
to the defendant might place an unfair financial burden on the class
representative and dissuade the bringing of class action suits, the
72
court may deny costs to the prevailing defendant.
Rule 23(e) requires the approval of the court before a class action suit is dismissed or compromised. 73 This rule is designed to protect the class from a settlement which is against the interests of the
class. But the juxtaposition of a class action suit under Rule 23 and
an offer of judgment under Rule 68 may present the court with a
Hobson's choice. A court may, under Rule 23(e), reject a settlement
made pursuant to an offer of judgment because of the superseding
interests of the plaintiff class, but this decision may cast a dispro70. 2 H. NEWBERG, CLASS AcTIONS § 2780 (1977).
71. Black Hills Alliance v. Regional Forester, 526 F. Supp. 257 (D.S.D.
1981). The plaintiffs in that case were awarded costs in an action which was
dismissed because of mootness. Id. at 260. In awarding costs to the plaintiff, the
court considered that the action was brought in good faith, that the public and
the defendants benefited from the litigation, and that the denial of costs to the
plaintiffs would unduly inhibit future environmental suits. Id. at 359-60; see
also County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 76 F.R.D. 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
Costs were denied to the prevailing defendants after the court considered several relevant factors, including the enormous resources of the defendants and
the substantial burden which would otherwise be imposed on the plaintiffs. Id.
at 473-74.
72. The court may be especially reluctant to award costs to the defendant in
those class action suits where the potential individual recovery of class members, including the class representative, is small.
73. This rule states:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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portionate and possibly enormous financial burden on the class representative. In addition, the court will be nullifying the command
of Rule 68. If, on the other hand, the court acknowledges the legitimate interests of the class representative in avoiding such a financial burden and allows the offer of judgment to be accepted, the
court may be elevating the individual concerns of the class representative over the interests of the many class members. The court
will then be ignoring the purpose of Rule 23(e) which is to protect
class members from settlements which are contrary to the interests
of the class.
The mandatory cost-shifting of Rule 68, therefore, seems illsuited to class action suits. 74 The interests of the class must be preserved while protecting class representatives from the undue
financial burdens which will deter the filing of class action suits. It
is best then that Rule 54(d) govern the allocation of costs in a class
action suit.
Even if the mandatory cost-shifting under Rule 68 does not extend to class action suits, the defendant is not necessarily precluded
from making an offer of judgment. An offer of judgment in such a
case will not automatically shift post-offer costs to the plaintiff if
the plaintiff's recovery is less than the recovery offered by the defendant. The offer, however, could be considered by the court when
exercising its discretion under Rule 54(d) to award or deny costs to
the prevailing party. 75 For example, if the plaintiff had spurned an
offer of judgment and then lost the case, the court might be more
inclined to award costs to the prevailing defendant. Alternatively,
if the plaintiff had rejected an offer of judgment providing substantially the same relief awarded the plaintiff class, the court might
deny the recovery of post-offer costs by the prevailing plaintiff
class.
PLAINTIFF'S OFFERS

While Rule 68 should be narrowed to exclude class action suits,
it should be broadened so that plaintiffs as well as defendants can
make offers of judgment. The purpose of the rule will be furthered
by expanding its scope because plaintiffs as well as defendants will
be able to use the threat of mandatory cost-shifting as leverage in
inducing settlements. Plaintiffs will also be able to ensure that they
74. The court in Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 86 F.R.D.
500 (N.D. Cal. 1980) refused to apply Rule 68 to a class action suit because of the
peculiar problems associated with class actions. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
75. Cf. Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 356 n.16 (1981) (although Rule 68 is
inapplicable when a defendant has prevailed, an offer of judgment is still admissible to influence a judge's discretion under Rule 54(d)).
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are relieved of the burden of paying for costs incurred after serving
an offer of judgment containing a less favorable settlement than the
relief ultimately obtained by the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION

Offers of judgment could represent useful devices for settling
cases and controlling the escalating costs of litigation. They are neglected litigation tools, however, in part because their existence is
not widely known among attorneys and, in part, because of ambiguities and gaps in Rule 68. The former problem is largely attributable to law schools whose pedagogical focus is on the trial of cases
rather than the settlement of cases. This problem can be ameliorated by the educational efforts of law schools and attorneys' professional organizations.
The latter problem, the ambiguities and gaps in Rule 68, can be
rectified through amendment of the rule. The following amendments will clarify Rule 68 and improve its efficacy as a settlement
device. First, the rule should be amended so that the mandatory
cost-shifting envisioned by the rule occurs when the defendant
prevails and not just when the plaintiff prevails but recovers less
than the amount offered by the defendant in the offer of judgment.
Second, the rule should require a defendant to include the plaintiff's accrued reasonable attorney's fees as a separate part of the offer of judgment when the offer is to settle a claim in which the
prevailing plaintiff would statutorily be entitled to attorney's fees.
Third, Rule 68 should specify that in such a case the decision regarding the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded the plaintiff
following acceptance of an offer of judgment will be vested in the
court.
Fourth, it is advisable to amend Rule 68 so that it clearly states
that, when a plaintiff's recovery is less than the recovery offered by
the defendant, the plaintiff must assume not only the burden of
paying for the plaintiff's own costs incurred after the offer of judgment was made, but must pay the defendant's post-offer costs as
well. In addition, in a case in which the prevailing plaintiff would
be entitled to a statutory fee award, the plaintiff would be barred
from recovering post-offer attorney's fees from the defendant if the
relief ultimately obtained was less favorable than the relief proffered in the Rule 68 offer. Fifth, Rule 68 should exempt class action
suits from the rule's coverage. Finally, the rule should be amended
so that plaintiffs as well as defendants can use offers of judgment to
exert pressure to settle.
The proposed changes in the rule should remove uncertainties
which have inhibited the effective use of offers of judgment, and
the changes will also promote settlements by clearly increasing the
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risks of rejecting an offer of judgment. In addition, they represent a
fair means by which a party may transfer to an opponent the burden of paying for costs, and in some instances attorney's fees, whose
incursion could have been avoided had the offeree accepted the offer of judgment which proved to be more favorable to the offeree
than the final outcome.
There are some who will argue that applying Rule 68 to certain
types of claims, such as civil rights claims, will serve as an impediment to the litigation of such claims. This argument is of course
true since the purpose of Rule 68 is to discourage the further pursuit of claims which can and should be settled. 76 Plaintiff's attorneys may be especially vocal in their objections to an amendment
which would bar the recovery of post-offer attorney's fees in civil
rights cases. Recovery of a plaintiff's post-offer attorney's fees,
however, would only be precluded when the incursion of those fees
was for naught, when settlement would have avoided a useless expenditure of the parties' time and money and the court's resources.
One might argue that to insist on litigating the case and representing the plaintiff in the face of such a settlement offer should be at
the attorney's peril.
In addition, if Rule 68 is amended so that plaintiffs can also
make offers of judgment, the plaintiff will not be left in a no-win,
"take it or leave it" situation. If the plaintiff considers the amount
offered by the defendant insufficient but is reticent to assume the
risk of paying post-offer costs and the plaintiff's post-offer attorney's fees, the plaintiff can serve the defendant with an offer of
judgment whose terms are more palatable to the plaintiff. The end
result of the offers and counteroffers, all of which will be backed up
by the threat of mandatory cost-shifting, will often be a settlement.
The settlement, like most settlements, will generally not wholly
please the parties; the settlement resulting from acceptance of an
offer of judgment will, however, terminate a lawsuit when further
litigation is needless.

76. In addition, although some causes of action are exempted from the federal rules under Rule 81 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, civil rights
actions are not presently so exempt. FED. R. Civ. P. 81.

